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Abstract
Real social interactions occur on networks in which each individual is con-
nected to some, but not all, of others. In social dilemma games, heterogeneity
in the number of contacts per player is known to promote evolution of coopera-
tion in a fixed population size. With positively biased payoff structure, which is
customarily used in evolutionary games, players with more neighbors play more
frequently, earn more, and propagate cooperation to others. However, maintain-
ing a social contact can be costly, and so the gross payoff per participation is
not necessarily positive. We show that even a relatively small participation cost
extinguishes the advantage of heterogeneous networks. In this situation, more
connected players are charged more so that they are no longer spreaders of coop-
eration. If participation is even more costly, those with fewer contacts win and
guide the evolution. Although the baseline payoff modulated by the participa-
tion cost is irrelevant in homogeneous networks, it drastically affect evolution on
heterogeneous networks.
1 Introduction
Cooperation of individuals is a key phenomenon at many different scales. Many small
organisms and social animals including humans alike show altruistic behavior even
when being selfish is apparently optimal for an individual. Emergence of altruism in
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situations of social dilemmas can be explained by various mechanisms, such as kin
selection, direct reciprocity, and indirect reciprocity (1). Altruism is also provided by
spatial reciprocity derived from the viscosity of populations (1–3). In reality, players
involved in a social game are not well-mixed as assumed in many studies but prefer-
entially interact with others nearby. As an extreme case, players can be aligned on a
spatially structured graph such as the square lattice. Then cooperators form close-knit
clusters of conspecifics to survive the invasion of selfish defectors. Maintenance of such
clusters is much more difficult in well-mixed populations modeled by the random graph
and the all-to-all connected network.
To be more realistic, players often inhabit networks of social contacts more complex
than the square lattice, the random graph, and the all-to-all connected network (4).
First, real social networks are small-world, implying the combination of abundant lo-
calized interactions, as in the square lattice, and sufficient shortcuts that connect seem-
ingly remote players, as in the random graph. Second, players are heterogeneous in
terms of the number of contacts with others. An extreme case of this is the scale-free
network in which the number of neighbors is distributed according to the power law. In
conventional networks, the number of neighbors is the same for everybody (regular lat-
tices and the all-to-all connected network) or distributed with a narrow tail (so-called
Erdo¨s-Reny´ı random graph). Even though not all social networks are scale-free, the
number of neighbors is naturally heterogeneous.
Recently, it was shown that such heterogeneous networks promote evolution of
cooperation in symmetrical two-person games with dilemma, namely, the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, the snowdrift game, and the stag hunt game. Particularly, scale-free networks
are strong amplifiers of altruism owing to broad distributions of the number of neighbors
(5–9). In these studies, the gross payoff, namely, the typical payoff obtained through
one interaction, is positively biased. Then it is worth participation, and this is the key
to enhanced cooperation. For illustration, we denote by hot players those with many
neighbors, such as hubs (players with many neighbors) (10). Cold players are those
with a small number of neighbors, such as leaves in a network. Hot players are allowed
in more rounds of the game than cold players per unit time. Then hot players earn
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more than cold players because of ‘base’ payoffs that are proportional to the number of
neighbors. As a result, hot players are more successful in disseminating their strategies.
Particularly, cooperation once adopted by a hub is stable, and so altruism is spread
via hubs.
This situation is realized by two-person games that consist of all nonnegative payoff
values or positively biased payoff matrices (5–9). To our knowledge, this assumption has
been made in all the existing studies of games on heterogeneous networks (e.g. (11–16))
and coevolutionary dynamics of network structure and strategies (17–19) (but see a
general framework in (20; 21)). Such payoff matrices give priority to hot players.
However, they win not because they play well but because they are connected to many
others.
In this paper, we critically reexamine the effect of heterogeneous networks on emer-
gence of cooperation. In real games, participation in the game may be costly. A
connection to a neighbor implies building and maintaining communication, and this
cost is actually modeled in some economic models of network formation (22–24). Ex-
pensive entry fees would dismiss the premium of hot players, and then the altruism
may not be promoted on heterogeneous networks.
We study two-person games with the participation cost on networks of a fixed size.
We show that there are three regimes depending on how costly participation is. First,
when participation is inexpensive as in most studies, we confirm the known result:
cooperation is enhanced on heterogeneous networks. Second, when the participation
cost is intermediate, the effect of the game and that of the network are comparable.
In this situation, altruism does not develop on heterogeneous networks. Third, when
participation is very costly, initial strategies of cold players propagate to other players,
with hot players myopically following what cold players do. With the low and high
participation cost, networks rather than the rule of the game dominate the evolutionary
dynamics. In the intermediate regime, evolution is most sensitive to the game structure.
3
2 Model
We compare effects of two types of networks on the evolution of cooperation. A diluted
well-mixed population is modeled by the regular random graph in which each player has
8 neighbors that are chosen randomly from the population. Heterogeneous networks are
modeled by the scale-free network model proposed by Baraba´si and Albert (BA model),
in which the number of neighbors denoted by k follows the power law p(k) ∝ k−3 (25).
Note that many real networks support p(k) ∝ k−γ for a wide range of k, with γ
typically falling between 2 and 3 (4). The average number of neighbors in the scale-
free networks is set equal to 8 for fair comparison with the regular random graph. Both
types of networks consist of n = 5000 players.
To probe the network effect, we consider only two simple strategies without memory,
namely, unconditional cooperation and unconditional defection. The initial fraction of
cooperators is denoted by c0. In one generation, everybody participates in the two-
person game with all the neighbors. The payoff matrix will be specified in the next
section.
Each player tends to copy successful strategies in its neighborhood. We apply the
update rule compatible with the replicator dynamics, following the previous literature
(6–8). Suppose that player x with kx neighbors has obtained generation-payoff Px. To
update the strategy, x selects a player y among the kx neighbors with equal probability
(= 1/kx). Then x copies y’s strategy with probability (Py − Px) / {max (kx, ky) ·
[uppermost payoff in one game - lowermost payoff in one game] } if Py > Px. The
denominator is the normalization constant so that the replacement probability ranges
between 0 and 1. If Py ≤ Px, the strategy of x is unchanged. All the players experience
updating according to this rule synchronously. This completes one generation.
Each evolutionary simulation consists of 5000 generations. The final fraction of
cooperators denoted by cf is calculated as the average fraction of cooperators based on
the last 1000 generation of 5 runs with different initializations for each network and 5




We first examine how the participation cost affects the level of altruism in the Prisoner’s









The entries of Eq. (1) indicate the payoff that the row player gains when playing against
an opponent, who is the column player. The first (second) row and column correspond
to cooperation (defection). The Prisoner’s Dilemma arises when T > 1, and larger T
results in more defectors. With participation cost h, the payoff matrix becomes
(
1− h −h
T − h −h
)
. (2)
Note that the introduction of h preserves the structure of the Prisoner’s Dilemma as
far as T > 1. Scale-free networks amplify cooperation when participation is costless
(h = 0) (6–8).
Figure 1 presents the final fraction of cooperators cf with T and h varied. The level
of cooperation is not affected by h on the regular random graph (Fig. 1(a)). Because
each player has the same number of neighbors, participation cost does not differentiate
the players.
By contrast, h has a dramatic influence for the scale-free networks, as shown in
Fig. 1(b). We found three qualitatively different scenarios, which roughly correspond
to (I) h ≤ 0.25, (II) 0.25 ≤ h ≤ 2, and (III) h ≥ 2. The transition between (II) and
(III) is fairly gradual.
3.1.1 Regime (I): Costless Participation
When h ≤ 0.25, participation is costless, and hot players such as hubs are strong
competitors regardless of the strategies of their cold neighbors. Hot players gain more
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because they play more often than cold cooperators and cold defectors do (26). As a
result, cooperation spreads from hot players to their cold neighbors. This increases the
local density of cooperators around the hot players so that hot players gain more by
mutual cooperation. Cooperation triggered by hot players is self-promotive so that the
fraction of cooperators in the entire population can become large. Defective hot players
may also win for a moment. However, defection then prevails in their neighborhood so
that hot defectors can no longer exploit the neighbors because of mutual defection. This
results in a null generation-payoff of hot defectors so that they can be outperformed
by their cold neighbors. A hot player sticks to cooperation but not to defection.
In sum, heterogeneous networks enhance cooperativity, which recovers the previous
work corresponding to h = 0 (6–9). Note that this regime encompasses h < 0, that
is, when gifts are given for participation so that every player always wins a positive
payoff.
To illuminate on different dynamics of hot and cold players, we measure how often
different players flip the strategy during the transient. As shown in Fig. 2, colder
players experience more flips when h ≤ 0.25. They myopically follow what hotter
players do until cooperation on hubs is fixated and propagated to these cold players.
Hot players are spreaders of cooperation. Cooperation on hubs is stabilized in an early
stage, yielding less flips of hotter players.
3.1.2 Regime (II): Moderately Expensive Participation
Interestingly, cold players spread their strategies to hot players when h ≥ 0.25 (regimes
(II) and (III)), which is opposite to what occurs in regime (I). For this reason, enhanced
cooperation diminishes, even with a relatively small participation cost.
Regime (II) is defined by small to intermediate h (0.25 ≤ h ≤ 2). Now the payoff
structure is as important as the network structure. When h = 0.3, scale-free networks
surpass the regular random graph in terms of the number of cooperators only for
1 ≤ T ≤ 1.4. When h = 0.6, this range shrinks to 1 ≤ T ≤ 1.1. The privilege of scale-
free networks is entirely lost when h = 1. In regime (II), hot players flip strategies


























Figure 1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma on networks with participation costs. The initial
fraction of cooperators c0 = 0.5. The final fraction of cooperators (cf ) for (a) the










Figure 2: Frequency of strategy flips in the Prisoner’s Dilemma on the scale-free net-
works. The average number of flips per player is plotted as a function of the number
of neighbors. The lines correspond to h = 0 (thinnest line), 0.2, 0.23, 0.24, 0.25, 0.3,
and 0.5 (thickest line). The payoff matrix is given by Eq. (2) with T = 1.5.
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Hubs no longer conduct the dynamics.
3.1.3 Regime (III): Costly Participation
When h is roughly greater than 2, participation is really costly. Then cold players
with any strategy surpass hot players and govern the dynamics. This is not because
cold players are tactical but because they play less often and lose less than hot players.
Cold players persist in their initial strategies to be reproduced on hot neighbors. Then,
the final fraction of cooperators cf remains almost the same as the initial fraction c0
regardless of T (Fig. 1(b)).
Figure 3 shows sample time courses of the cooperator fraction for various values of
c0. On scale-free networks, cf is roughly equal to c0 in regime (III) (Fig. 3(d)). Let us
remark that dependence on initial conditions also appears in regime (II) (Fig. 3(c)), for
which cooperation prospers only for large c0. The dependence of cf on c0 diminishes
in regime (I) despite large fluctuation (Fig. 3(b)). Also on the regular random graph,
the dependence on c0 is absent (Fig. 3(a)).
We observe qualitatively the same effects of participation costs in other network
models. The scale-free networks based on the configuration model (without growth
and preferential attachment) and the Erdo¨s-Reny´ı random graph promote altruism
in regime (I), albeit to a lesser extent than the BA model (6–8). However, these
heterogeneous networks do not enhance altruism in regimes (II) and (III) (results not
shown).
3.2 Snowdrift Game
The snowdrift game originates from a situation of two drivers caught in a snowdrift.
For the two cars to get out, which is equivalent to payoff β(> 1) to both drivers, the
snow must be shoveled away. A total effort of unity must be invested to this task.
Two players may cooperate to share the cost so that each pays 1/2. Alternatively, one
player may cover the full cost. Otherwise, both may refuse to be altruistic to miss the



























































































Figure 3: Final fractions of cooperators cf for c0 = 0.1, 0.2, . . ., 0.9 in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. We set T = 1.2. (a) The regular random graph with h = 0, and the scale-
free networks with (b) h = 0 (regime (I)), (c) h = 0.5 (regime (II)), and (d) h = 2
(regime (III)).
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In this case, heterogeneous networks reinforce evolution of cooperation as in the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (6–8). The participation cost shifts the payoff matrix with the structure
of the snowdrift game preserved. The payoff matrix is translated to
(
β − 1/2− h β − 1− h
β − h −h
)
. (4)
As shown in Fig. 4(a), the participation cost h does not influence cf on the regular
random graph. The fraction of cooperators converges to the theoretical estimate cf =
1− r, where r = 1/(2β−1) is the cost-to-benefit ratio (27). If cooperation is relatively
costly with a small β (large r), cooperators decrease in number.
On heterogeneous networks, how the fraction of cooperators depends on the payoff
structure, which is parameterized by r, differs by the participation cost. We again find
three types of r-dependence. By varying h, one can gradually go from one regime to
another, as shown in Fig. 4(b). The scale-free networks can be superior to the regular
random graph in the enhancement of cooperation, only when h is near zero or negative
(regime (I)). In this situation, hot players distribute cooperation to cold players. The
advantage of the scale-free networks is neutralized by intermediate h (roughly speaking,
h ∼= 1), which defines regime (II). Note that the reduction of cooperation is not as much
as that for the Prisoner’s Dilemma. With large h (roughly speaking, h ≥ 2), cf is rather
insensitive to the game structure (regime (III)). In regimes (II) and (III), dominant

















Figure 4: The snowdrift game on (a) the regular random graph and (b) the scale-free
networks. We set c0 = 0.5.
3.3 General Games
With the participation cost incorporated, general symmetrical two-person games with




C R− h S − h
D T − h P − h

 (5)
In accordance with the previous sections, we denote the strategy corresponding to the
first (second) row and column by cooperation (defection). As T increases, players are
tempted to defect, and cf decreases. As S decreases, players would not cooperate
so that they are not exploited by defectors. Therefore, cf decreases. The Prisoner’s
Dilemma, the snowdrift game, and the stag hunt game, are defined by T > R > P > S,
T > R > S > P , and R > T > P > S, respectively. An additional condition
2R > T + S is usually assumed for the Prisoner’s Dilemma so that payoffs of two
players sum up to be larger with mutual cooperation than with unilateral cooperation.
We remove these restrictions on the payoff values to deal with general games. Be-
cause multiplying each element of Eq. (5) by a common constant modifies just the time
scale of evolution, there are three free parameters in the payoff matrix. Accordingly,
we set R = 1 and P = 0 and vary T , S, and h.
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In Fig. 5(a), cf for h = 0 is plotted for the regular random graph. As expected,
the number of cooperators increases with T and decreases with S. The results are
independent of h because all the players have the same number of neighbors and are
charged the same participation cost per generation.
For the scale-free networks, we plot cf measured in the T -S parameter space that
are sliced out by fixing four values of h (Fig. 5(b-e)). In this way we confirm the three
regimes, extending the results shown in Figs. 1 and 4 in terms of the variety of the
game. First, without the participation cost, evolution of cooperation is promoted on the
scale-free networks (Fig. 5(b)), which reproduces the previous work (7). Cooperation
is strengthened in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (T > 1, S < 0), the snowdrift game (T > 1,
S > 0), and also the stag hunt game (T < 1, S < 0). Second, the advantage of
the heterogeneity is lost for a wide range of T and S when h = 0.5 (Fig. 5(c)) and
h = 1 (Fig. 5(d)). Third, when participation is very costly (h = 2), the evolutionary
dynamics is governed by the initial condition. Defectors survive even without dilemma
(S > 0, T < 1), and considerable cooperators survive under the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(Fig. 5(e)). These paradoxical results yield because the effect of players’ actions is
smeared as h increases. Note that cf shown in Fig. 5(e) is sensitive to c0, which is fixed
to be a half in the numerical simulations.
4 Discussion
4.1 Summary of Results
We have discovered that the cost of participation casts a dramatic effect on the dy-
namics of evolutionary games on heterogeneous networks. This is because players are
charged different amounts of fees per generation depending on the number of neigh-
bors with whom they play. By contrast, the evolution in well-mixed populations and
on the regular lattices is invariant under changes in the participation cost, which affects
everybody alike.
Specifically, we have found three regimes. When participation is nearly free (regime




































Figure 5: Final fractions of cooperators cf in the T -S space for (a) the regular random
graph and the scale-free networks with (b) h = 0, (c) h = 0.5, (d) h = 1, and (e) h = 2.
We set c0 = 0.5.
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free networks, promote cooperation (5–9). This is because the cooperation adopted by
hot players, namely, players with many neighbors, is robust against invasion of cold
players with whatever strategy. Hot players have advantage there. When the participa-
tion cost is intermediate (regime (II)), cooperators do not really increase on heteroge-
neous networks. Quantitatively speaking, scale-free networks can be even detrimental
to altruism than homogeneous networks are. When participation is expensive (regime
(III)), cold players are strong regardless of strategies, and hot players myopically fol-
low whatever cold players do. This is opposite to what happens in regime (I). If the
participation were voluntary in regime (III) (28), the loners that abstain from playing
the game would be dominant (24).
Although the boundaries are not sharp, these three regimes are distinguished based
on population behavior for a wide class of games encompassing the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
the snowdrift game, and the stag hunt game. We have focused on a standard growing
scale-free network model (BA model) and confirmed our results on a nongrowing scale-
free network model and the random graph. The results are expected to be robust
against the choice of the network model.
To our knowledge, almost all the existing work on evolutionary games on networks
used the nonnegative or positively biased payoffs, which belong to regime (I). Although
the advantage of heterogeneity is manifested in this regime, the payoff matrix will fall
in regime (II) or (III) even with a relatively small participation cost. Therefore, the en-
hanced cooperation emphasized in these previous papers is not robust. To understand
games on networks, we have to take into account a wider family of payoff matrices than
conventionally used ones. In the present work, an additional dimension of the payoff
matrix is provided by the participation cost.
Our results will remain valid with more sophisticated strategies, although we have
assumed only unconditional cooperators and defectors. The three regimes must be also
distinguished in coevolutionary dynamics of strategies and network structure, where
players can form and sever links as well as play against neighbors. So far, only regime
(I) where hubs can boost cooperation has been explored for evolutionary games (5–9;
12; 13; 15; 29) and coevolutionary dynamics (17–19; 26; 30), except a brief examination
14
in (21).
4.2 What is to Play Games on Networks?
One way to circumvent the heterogeneity effect without introducing the participation
cost is to use homogeneous networks in which everybody has the same number of
neighbors. The square lattice (3), variants of small-world and random graphs without
the dispersion of the number of neighbors (31; 32), and cycles in which everybody is
connected to two players (10; 33) serve to this end. Pair approximation is useful for
understanding evolution on homogeneous networks (34). Evolution on a heterogeneous
network and on its homogeneous counterpart can look similar (11), but such consistency
is not guaranteed in general. Because heterogeneity cannot be neglected in most real
networks (4), homogeneous networks are too restrictive.
For general networks, one can eliminate the heterogeneity effect by using average
payoffs (dividing the generation-payoff of each player by the number of neighbors). This
quantity is independent of the number of neighbors. This normalization is adopted in
studies of evolutionary games on standard small-world networks, which are endowed
with some heterogeneity, (35), scale-free networks (9), hierarchical networks (16), real
networks (14), and multipopulation replicator dynamics in which the numbers of con-
tacts depend on the strategy (36).
However, this normalization spoils the notion of game. To see this, let us consider
three players arranged as shown in Fig. 6. Player B, a hot player with two contacts,
plays twice more than players A and C do. If A pays cost c to benefit B by b (> c)
and C does the same, a total value of 2(b − c) is created in the network. After the
normalization, A and C lose c, respectively, whereas B earns 2b/2 = b. This implies
that two altruistic actions, one contributed by A and another by C, yield only b;
2b − b = b has gone away. Similarly, if B donates to A and C, A and C gain b, and B
loses 2c/2 = c. A net value 2b is produced out of c. In reality, values do not emerge
out of scratch or disappear for nothing. This caveat holds for more general games and
networks.








Figure 6: Game on a network of three players.
with its neighbors. The same framework is used in evolutionary games on diluted
spatial networks (29), the small-world networks (12; 15), the random graphs with the
poisson degree distribution (5; 13; 15), scale-free networks (6–9), and dynamically
changing networks (17; 18; 20; 26; 30).
4.3 Setting Payoff Structure
Let us assume that total payoffs, not average payoffs, are used in updating strategies.
For well-mixed populations and regular lattices, evolution is invariant under uniform
addition of a constant to the payoff matrix (e.g. participation cost) and uniform mul-
tiplication of a positive constant. These transformations leave two free parameters in
the payoff matrix. On heterogeneous networks, evolutionary dynamics are conserved
under multiplication but not under addition. The loss of cooperation under positive
affine transformation of the payoff matrix is also pointed out in (21). Then there are
three free parameters that have been chosen to be S, T , and h in Fig. 5.
When participation is costless (regime (I)) or very costly (regime (III)), the net-
work structure, but not the rule of the game, determines the evolution. Only when
participation is moderately costly (regime (II)), the game is relevant. There we have
found that cooperation is not enhanced by introducing heterogeneous networks.
Regime (II) originates from balanced payoff values. The balance implies that some
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payoff values are positive and others are negative and that their average, or the gross
payoff, is not far away from 0. Even though we can arbitrarily set the ‘origin’ of
the payoff matrix by modulating the participation cost in homogeneous populations,
this operation is disallowed in heterogeneous populations. Balanced payoff matrices
may be relevant to many real situations. One way to balance a payoff matrix is to
introduce moderate participation costs, as has been done in this work. Moreover, in
an equivalent of the snowdrift game called the chicken game, players try to avoid both
being labeled chicken and crashing into a miserable disaster. The corresponding payoff
matrix can be balanced or negatively biased because the benefit of mutual cooperation,
or β−1/2−h in Eq. (4), may be null or even negative (27). Also in practical situations
such as environmental problems, political conflicts, and human relationships, the best
one could get is often the least disastrous, but not really wonderful, solution.
It is generally difficult to quantitatively determine payoffs in nature. However,
we need to be aware of their absolute values when considering game dynamics on
heterogeneous networks. This paper is a first step to establishing a notion of game on
complex interaction networks.
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